The State\u27s Responsibility for Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Reed, Walter D.
124 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
would think also fear of reciprocity should be added. There is no certainty of
prosecution for violations of these prohibitions.
You may conclude, from what I have said that we have gained little ground
in holding individuals responsible for violation of the prohibitions of the laws
of armed conflict. I would suggest to you that the ad hoc tribunals of Nurem-
berg and the Far East at the close of World War II were unique and necessary
and that the trials arising out of the Vietnam incident, regardless of the decision
reached in a particular case, were equally necessary. To say that this system of
accountability has failed because all persons who violated the prohibitions
cannot be found and punished would condemn all criminal law systems to
failure. We, as a civilized country, and any nation so claiming a national
morality, can and should punish its citizens who violate the laws of armed con-
flict. We must also see to it that those not of our citizenry who violate basic rules
of human behavior are brought to the bar of justice. More importantly, we must
insure that our people are fully educated and well-trained in the requirements
of the law of armed conflict, that these rules of war are integrated into our own
personal moral codes and integrated into our military thinking and basic
military doctrines. Only by such training and total integration into our thinking
can observance of the law be more successfully achieved.
MAJOR GENERAL VAGUE: To abate your breathless anticipation, we now
have a mystery speaker who will speak briefly on "State Responsibility for
Compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict." I think he has had some con-
nection with the Geneva Conference on the Laws of War, because he has been
spending an enormous amount of my travel money flipping back and forth
across the Atlantic as a member of the United States Delegation in Geneva for
the last three years. He is the Chairman of your Committee. It is my pleasure
to present my Assistant, General Walter Reed.
The State's Responsibility for
Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict
BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER D. REED
Each of the panelists has been talking about various aspects of the state's
responsibility. I am not going to repeat what they have said. But I think it's
important that we sum up on this question because it's a little bit broader than
the sum of each of the individual presentations today.
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First, a state's obligation in this context has several parts. States have the
primary responsibility to assure that legal restraint exists during wartime. States
acting individually and collectively establish and formulate the law applicable
in armed conflict. We have heard today about that process in Geneva. It may
be worth repeating that civilized states have an obligation to participate in
efforts to formulate rules which are practical and which provide maximum
protection for civilians and other protected innocent victims during armed
conflict while incorporating the reality of armed hostilities into those rules.
This is a difficult and seemingly impossible task, but the United States and the
United Kingdom are carrying out their responsibility to try to formulate those
practical rules with an honest and diligent effort. As our Secretary of State said
last year at the American Bar Association meeting in Montreal: "The United
States is committed to the principle that fundamental human rights require
legal protection under all circumstances, that some kinds of individual suffering
are intolerable no matter what threat nations may face."
The second responsibility of a state is to insure that machinery exists within
the domestic structure which will facilitate dissemination, understanding and
enforcement of the law. And I would emphasize the need for all three factors.
The United States has been one of the early leaders in formulating humani-
tarian rules applicable in armed conflict. But if we expect the rules to be
complied with we have to have them widely disseminated. It is not enough to
disseminate them throughout the armed forces in peacetime; it is not enough
to confront the soldier with these rules for the first time when he enters the
armed forces shortly before going into combat. The civilian population needs
to hear more about this body of rules.
Third, there must be understanding that the state owes an obligation to its
own people and to the world community to assure that the rules are understood.
Now this involves more than just distributing the printed rules. It involves an
educational process both in the civilian and in the military communities. We
cannot rely solely upon our social structure to impose a high moral code; some-
thing like the conduct of "English gentlemen" that Sir David referred to. In
the combat environment, a moral code not based on training and discipline can
and will break down. I believe there is no question about the high standard of
moral conduct of the U.S. serviceman under normal conditions. But in combat,
when he is living with the constant threat of death, often from an unseen enemy;
when he is seeing his friends and associates killed by attacks often from women,
sometimes children, when you couple that with placing in his hands the tremen-
dous fire power capable of destroying the enemy, then the usual reliance upon
moral restraint perhaps isn't enough. It requires greater training and under-
standing and discipline, and requires training under simulated combat condi-
tions. I don't in any way endorse or excuse attacks on innocent civilians or
innocent victims of war, but I think we have to realize that the question is
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broader than just providing rules and short term training for military personnel
when they enter the armed forces or immediately prior to entering battle. The
Department of Defense has taken the first steps, and important steps, toward
education and training. But I think this aspect of understanding within the
civilian community is essential to achieve acceptable standards of compliance.
And then there is enforcement. It is most important to incorporate the legal
limits into the Rules of Engagement. The Rules, as they now stand, are general.
An effective system of enforcement requires rules promulgated with such cer-
tainty that all elements can be examined and evidence submitted to a competent
tribunal, and the accused individual given an opportunity to present evidence
and defend himself. Existing United States law provides for the enforcement
of the laws of war. Article I of the Constitution provides that Congress has the
power to make rules for the Government of the Land and Naval Forces and the
power to define and punish offenses against the Law of Nations. In the exercise
of that authority Congress has provided for jurisdiction to punish violations of
the laws of war and has fixed that jurisdiction in courts-martial. It has also
recognized a concurrent jurisdiction in military commissions, and other military
tribunals. However, as efforts are undertaken to make the humanitarian rules
more specific, I think consideration has to be given to the need for greater
codification and to provide individuals with the judicial safeguards to which
they are entitled under our traditional standards of fairness.
Mr. Wiley has spoken about another responsibility. The responsibility for
reporting and investigating violations. The idea of victor's justice is no longer
acceptable. States cannot, as a matter of practice, sweep under the rug viola-
tions of their own forces and look only to the excesses of the enemy. No rule of
humanity can exist under those conditions.
So in conclusion, I would say that the state's responsibility for compliance
requires, first, that states continue to strive to formulate practical rules.
Second, they must disseminate those rules throughout their entire populations.
Third, states must assure a degree of understanding throughout their popula-
tion through education and training. And fourth, states must provide for
enforcement and in appropriate cases, punishment for violations. Now that
may be utopia, but I believe civilized nations must never cease trying to achieve
those goals.
Questions and Answers
The following questions were asked by members of the audience.
Q. Is there anything the United Nations is doing to develop either a limitation
on weapons or a general alleviation of the problems of suffering in time of war?
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: I think most progress is being made outside the
United Nations: in the conferences in Geneva and in conferences related to the
United Nations but conducted somewhat separately, such as the Conference
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of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, which mainly deals with specific
weapons limitation questions. But the issues are discussed every fall in the
General Assembly. There are resolutions which may be helpful or not, urging
greater progress. But by its nature, the United Nations is both too big and too
small to deal with the problem. In general, the United Nations is encouraging
the effort but it is not trying to take it over.
Q. How are the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Articles being reconciled
to the stockpiling of hydrogen bombs?
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: YOU put your finger on a very sensitive difficulty.
One thing that seemed clear to uswhen we started these negotiations was that
in trying to codify for the first time since 1907 the laws of combat warfare, we
had a choice to make. Either we could try to take into account the use of nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction, or we could try to limit ourselves to
the development of law for a conflict which did not use weapons of mass des-
truction. We decided that the latter was the more sensible approach, because
if we tried to develop rules which had to be flexible enough that they could also
be squared with the use of weapons of mass destruction, the rules would be
meaningless for any other kind of conflict. Therefore, what we are trying to do
in Geneva is to develop combat rules that apply to general warfare but not to
the use of weapons of mass destruction. We simply said that the use of weapons
of mass destruction is beyond the competence of that conference and has to
be dealt with in disarmament forums, like the SALT talks with the Soviet
Union, and possibly in other initiatives.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM MR. WILEY: I would like to add that, as far
as the legal review of new weapons program by the Defense Department is
concerned, notwithstanding what Mr. Aldrich has said about the Geneva nego-
tiations, it is definitely part of our Departmental Weapons Review Program to
review new weapons developments which involve nuclear devices. That would
not only be in the tactical field but also involving strategic nuclear weapons.
One of the elements of American policy in recent years has been to refine the
accuracy of its strategic nuclear weapons and this has been the subject of great
debates in various quarters. Nuclear weapons will come under legal review. The
same underlying legal principles are applied to the extent feasible, in both the
pre-engineering developments stage and in the production decision phase.
Q. Have the third-world nations taken any action in the Geneva Negotiations
to limit developed countries to the use of spears?
SIR DAVID HUGHES-MORGAN: A distinguished delegate from an African
country complained bitterly at the first session in Geneva about the use of
sophisticated weapons against people who didn't have them. He called first for
the prohibition of aircraft against unsophisticated countries, then for the pro-
hibition of any sophisticated weapons, and, finally, said he really meant to call
for the abolition of suffering. Now the difficulty in answering your question is
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that it covers not merely the field that we mentioned but the work of the Ad Hoc
Committee, which is dealing with possible prohibitions of certain categories
of conventional weapons. The interesting thing is that the third-world countries
are the ones calling for the abolition of such weapons as napalm. In fact,
napalm is a pretty cheap weapon. The delivery system may be on the expensive
side, but it is the sort of weapon an undeveloped country might want to use.
These countries do, however, call for its abolition. Now, I am saying that as
a matter of strict law, providing you attack military objectives individually,
not collectively as in areas of target, and assuring you can aim the weapon with
reasonable accuracy, there is nothing unlawful in using that weapon against
targets in populated areas. But the moment you miss too many targets, and
the moment too many civilians are killed, you are going to get the ex post facto
judgment to which I referred and you will be accused of being in breach of
Article 46. For that reason, and the sort of smallish wars that are reported in
the media, which excite world interest, I think that states are going to have to
pay very considerable attention to the accuracy of their weapon delivery system
(provided that they worry about world opinion at all; because there are some
states that don't). I can equally foresee the possibility of war crimes trials in
the future where the prosecution allegation will be a breach of Article 46,
supposing it becomes law, and the defense will be that, "We were aiming at
a proper military target, but it is unfortunate we couldn't afford to buy the
expensive smart type arms which would have hit it. We are very sorry." Whether
a court will accept that defense or not will have to be judged when the time
comes.
Q. Is the United States meeting its responsibility to search out and try war
criminals inasmuch as there has been no attempt to revise the Constitution or
laws so as to try people who are out of the service by court-martial and who are
not otherwise triable by a federal court at this time?
MAJOR GENERAL VAGUE: Given the limitations on the legal means, as il-
lustrated by the Calley and Medina trials, the U.S. Government and the Army
in particular, is doing its best to bring violators to justice. The question certainly
points out some inadequacies in jurisdiction. But the government is not an
undivided whole. We are trying to have a remedy, but without the necessary
cooperation from the Congress thus far. Now there are other members of the
panel who may be better qualified than I to respond.
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: I think there isn't any question that a morecomplete
system of criminal jurisdiction to try war crimes is needed in the United States.
It does not necessarily have to be a court-martial jurisdiction. But something
is needed to insure that Americans who are accused of war crimes are not simply
allowed to go scot-free because there is no court to try them. We all recognize
the difficulties and political problems involved in extradition are such that it
would not be a very promising recourse. Therefore, we had better find ways
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to create jurisdiction ourselves. I wouldn't really be able to comment on the
efforts we have been making in this regard, because I think more has been done
by the Defense Department than by the State Department, but I trust, at any
rate, that we won't get something done before such time as we are presenting the
new Protocols to the Senate. We had better be introducing some implementing
legislation then.
MR. WILEY: I have just one comment. If we can get more complete and
prompt reporting than has been the case in various circumstances prior to this
point in time, then action can be taken against various people before they may
leave active military status. The lawyers are being given the job on the theory
that they are independent professionals reporting directly through their pro-
fessional command channels any violations which may not be reported or may
be blocked in reporting up through the regular command channels. That puts
quite a burden on the lawyers, but it is being put there because they are just
that, independent professionals.
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